Conservative Immigration Policy Reform Has Not Yet Produced Any Significant Improvement in the Aggregate Labour Market Performance of Recent Immigrants by Grady, Patrick
MPRA
Munich Personal RePEc Archive
Conservative Immigration Policy Reform
Has Not Yet Produced Any Significant
Improvement in the Aggregate Labour






MPRA Paper No. 55586, posted 30. April 2014 04:22 UTC
Global Economics
Conservative Immigration Policy Reform Has Not Yet
Produced Any Significant Improvement in the Aggregate
Labour Market Performance of Recent Immigrants
By
Patrick Grady
Global Economics Policy Paper 2013-1
October 1, 2013
Abstract:
This paper examines the performance of recent immigrants to Canada in the labour
market as revealed in the Longitudinal Immigration Database (IMDB), which is an
administrative database constructed by Statistics Canada by combining an administrative
landing file from Citizenship and Immigration with the T1 Family File (T1FF) from the
Canada Revenue Agency. As this database extends to 2010, it provides evidence on the
impact on the labour market performance of recent immigrants of the relatively ambitious
immigration reforms introduced by the Conservative Government. The conclusion of the
paper is that the overall performance of recent immigrants has not improved enough to
substantially reduce the wide earnings gap that has opened up between average recent
immigrant and overall earnings. There are many reasons for this, but the most important
is that the Conservative Government has continued to pursue a policy of high mass
immigration admitting around 250,000 new immigrants per year right through the 2008-
09 recession.
JEL Classification Codes: J23 – Labour demand; J24 – Human Capital; Skills;
Occupational Choice; Labor Productivity; J61 – Geographic mobility, immigrant
workers.
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Introduction
When the Conservative Government came to power in January 2006, it inherited a failing
immigration policy. Since the number of immigrants was increased in the late 1980s, the
performance of immigrants in the labour market had steadily deteriorated and new
immigrants had become an increasing drain on government. More precisely, in a recent
study Herbert Grubel and I estimated that recent immigrants imposed a fiscal burden of at
least $20 billion annually (1.1 percent of GDP) on Canadian taxpayers, mainly because
the income taxes paid by these immigrants are only about half those paid by Canadians,
while both groups receive the same benefits from government spending (Grubel and
Grady, 2011 and 2012).
To deal with the unsatisfactory situation, which threatened to get even worse if the
growing backlog of accepted, but not yet admitted, immigrants were all allowed in. The
Conservative Government eliminated the backlog by means of legislation, angering
many. It also tightened up the criteria for Federal Skilled Workers, and moved to ensure
that it was more difficult to make unjustified refugee claims.
At the same time, the Conservative Government has maintained a historically high level
of immigration of around 250,000 per year right through the Great Recession of 2008 and
soaring unemployment, which reached 8.7 per cent overall and was almost double that for
recent immigrants. This can be explained by a variety of factors including seeking to
appeal to Canada’s immigrant communities, keeping the private sector happy by making
available a plentiful supply of cheap foreign, keeping provincial governments happy by
letting them choose many of the newcomers (which they are also doing in response
largely to pressure from employers).
The question that needs to be asked is how successful has the Conservative immigration
policy reform been in improving the labour market performance of recent immigrants.
Incidentally, this is a question, which has been made much more difficult to answer by
the Conservative Government’s controversial decision to drop the long form
questionnaire from the 2011 Census. The new National Household Survey, which
replaced the long form, reportedly has a much lower response rate (68.6 per cent
compared to 93.5 per cent for the 2006 Census [McKenna, 2013]) and constitutes a
substantially different approach that will make it difficult, if not impossible, to compare
performance across time.
Fortunately, there is still data available from the Longitudinal Immigration Database
(IMDB), which is an administrative database constructed by Statistics Canada by
combining an administrative landing file from Citizenship and Immigration with the T1
Family File (T1FF) from the Canada Revenue Agency. It utilizes exact matching record
linkage techniques for immigrants who filed taxes at least once. The IMDB covers the
period between 1982 and 2010. An advantage of the IMDB over the census data is that it
provides a breakdown of immigrants into all of the various administrative categories,
which permits an analysis of how the different immigration programs are working and
contributing to the overall result. However, there are also drawbacks to the IMDB as a
resource for analysis of Conservative immigration policy. Like the Census, it suffers from
being almost three years out of date now and not capturing more recent developments,
which would allow more time for the Conservative immigration reforms to have an
impact. And as an administrative database it is subject to greater privacy concerns and is
only fully available to researchers that have been sworn in under the Statistics Act and
allowed to work under the control of Statistics Canada. However, some tabulations have
been made available on Statistics Canada’s website. This paper makes use of that data to
draw some conclusions about the success of Conservative immigration reform.
The Data
The two reference arrival years for studying the success of Conservative immigration
policies are 2006 and 2010. The immigrants included in the totals shown in Table 1 for
these two years are those who were approved in the four previous landing years (i.e.
2006, 2007, 2008 and 2009 for 2010; and 2002, 2003, 2004, and 2005 for 2006) and who
filed income taxes. This is done so that those immigrants counted in 2010 would reflect
the admission decisions made by the Conservative Government after it came to power
and those counted in 2006 would be attributed to admission decisions made by the
previous Liberal Government. The immigrants landing in the same year that the income
tax is filed and earnings are calculated (i.e. 2006 and 2010) are excluded as they land at
different times during the year and their annual earnings, which are used as an indicator
of the success of immigration policies, do not reflect a full year's participation in the
labour market.
Admittedly, the period of one-to-four years after landing used here is a very short one to
use for analyzing the results of changes in immigration policy on labour market
performance, but it utilizes all the data currently available and should provide an early
indicator of whether the Conservative immigration policy changes are going to be able to
significantly improve the poor performance of recent immigrants in the labour market.
The first thing worth noting in Table 1 is that the total number of immigrants included in
the database actually increased under the Conservatives. This is because the number of
provincial nominees and dependents, family class, and live- in-caregivers increased even
though the number of Federal skilled workers and dependents, and refugees landed in
Canada, which bore the brunt of the tightening introduced in the reforms, actually
decreased significantly. This reveals that clamping down on the Federal Skilled Worker
Program and screening out non-qualified refugee claimants are not enough by themselves
to reduce the overall number of immigrants.
The most meaningful indicator of the performance of recent immigrants in the labour
market is their average earnings, which includes both employment and self-employment
earnings. It is a measure of how much they contribute by their labour to Canada’s GDP
and, since labour income is by far the largest category of income, of how much they can
afford to pay to finance their share of Canada’s public spending.
The number of immigrants declaring employment or self-employment income on their T1
Tax forms is shown in Table 2. This is smaller than the total number of immigrants filing
tax returns in Table 1 because it only includes those with employment or self-
employment income and excludes those who filed to declare non-wage income such as
interest, dividends, capital gains, government transfers and to claim tax credits such as
the child tax benefit or the GST credit.
Average earnings are shown in Table 3. As stated above, this is the most meaningful
indicator of immigrants’ labour market performance. Interestingly, in spite of the very
ambitious package of immigration reforms heroically introduced by the Conservative
Government in the face of bitter opposition from advocates of mass immigration, the
improvement in average earnings is exceedingly modest only rising to $24,883 in 20010
from $23,328 in 2006. This left the average earnings at 63.2 per cent of overall average
earnings in 2010, up only slightly from 61.1 per cent in 2006 (Table 4). A gap in earnings
of this magnitude is large enough that it will still produce a growing fiscal burden from
immigration and will contribute to rising poverty in rapidly growing immigrant
communities. The only consolation that can be drawn from these results is that if the
Conservative Government had not acted to tighten requirements under the Federal Skilled
Worker Program and had admitted the over a million backlog that it legislated away the
gap in earnings would probably have risen substantially.
The performance of Federal Skilled Workers actually improved the most of all the
categories shown in Table 3 reflecting the Conservative Government’s greater emphasis
on employability (except for business class which was a very small category). The
performance of the Provincial/Territorial Nominees, principal applicants declined
significantly as their numbers increased, but their average earnings remained the highest
of all the categories bolstering the overall average. The Conservative Government’s
difficulty in improving overall performance of recent immigrants can be explained by the
fact that, while its efforts to improve performance by tightening criteria for Federal
Skilled Workers and rejecting non-eligible refugee claims worked, they were not
sufficient to offset the depressing impact on performance of larger numbers of family
class immigrants, live-in care givers and dependents, and refugees (including the other
humanitarian and compassionate category, which is related to failed refugee claims).
Federal Skilled Workers and Provincial Territorial Nominees are the only categories of
workers that earn enough to be able to pay their own way and contribute their share of the
government benefits enjoyed by all Canadians (Table 4).
Other categories of immigrants such as family class, live-in caregivers, and refugees, all
of which are still growing and experiencing deteriorating relative earnings, will continue
to undercut the improved performance of skilled workers and provincial nominees. The
poor performance of Family class has particularly large impact in depressing average
earnings because of their relatively large numbers (accounting for more than 30 per cent
of the total number of persons included in the count in 2010). The parents and
grandparents included in family class come to Canada late in their life and usually have
very little, if any, earning capacity in Canadian labour markets.
It is very difficult for any Government to reduce the numbers of Family class admitted in
the future as established immigrants become citizens and voters and understandably like
to help bring in many of their family members. And, once immigrants are admitted and
gain citizenship, it is considered by many to be non-Canadian to prevent their families
from following. Thus in determining whether it is economically advantageous to admit
skilled immigrants who are expected to do well, it is necessary to consider the
implications of their admissions for subsequent Family class immigrants who do not do
so well in the labour market and will probably require Government assistance. This
means that not only should the skilled immigrants be expected to pay their own way and
contribute economically, but they must also be able make enough to compensate for their
less successful family members who may impose a net fiscal cost on the country.
The Government’s failure to eliminate the live-in-caregiver and business immigrant
categories as part of its efforts to improve immigrant performance is difficult to
understand given the low earnings and/or problems and administrative abuses associated
with these two categories of immigrants.
Conclusions
To its credit, the Conservative Government has introduced ambitious reforms in
immigration policy since coming to power in January 2006. It sought and obtained
legislative authority that gave it the discretion to eliminate a backlog of immigrants
admitted under old criteria that were clearly not working. This in my view is its greatest
achievement as the admission of such a large number of under-qualified immigrants in a
short period of time would have resulted in a substantial deterioration in the performance
of recent immigrants and would have entailed exorbitant fiscal costs. It also restructured
the Federal Skilled Worker Program to put much greater weight on employability and
arranged employment. And it reformed the refugee admission process to try to weed out
non-genuine refugees.
Notwithstanding the relatively ambitious reforms introduced, the measured overall
performance of recent immigrants has not improved enough to substantially reduce the
wide gap that has opened up between average recent immigrant and overall earnings.
There are many reasons for this. But the most important is that the Conservative
Government has continued to pursue a policy of high mass immigration admitting around
250,000 new immigrants per year right through the 2008-09 recession. Needless to say, it
would be unrealistic to expect the Conservative Government’s reforms in immigration
policy, as desirable as they might be on their own merits, to by themselves produce the
desired improvement in immigrant labour market performance as they applied to only a
small proportion of immigrants.
The only viable solution to the problem of the growing fiscal burden and rising
immigrant poverty is a substantial reduction in the total number of immigrants admitted.
But this, of course, is not something that any Canadian Government is yet likely to
contemplate as it runs counter to that deeply-held belief that Canada always needs more
and more immigrants no matter how poorly they perform and how great of a fiscal burden
they impose. More new immigrants may increase aggregate GDP, but they will decrease
the living standards of existing Canadian residents unless they are able to earn at least as
much as other Canadians and thereby pay their own way.
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Table 1
Total Count by Immigrant Admission Category for Recent Immigrants
Landing in Previous Four Years in Number of Persons
Immigrant Admission Category 2006 2010
Total 628,825 661,745
Family class 189,660 205,110
Business class, principal applicants 9,510 10,350
Business class, spouses and dependents 16,955 19,335
Skilled workers, principal applicants 158,110 131,405
Skilled workers, spouses and dependents 128,285 105,310
Provincial/territorial nominees, principal applicants 6,230 28,280
Provincial/territorial nominees, spouses and dependents 6,735 26,930
Government-assisted refugees 17,535 17,145
Privately sponsored refugees 8,430 10,630
Refugees landed in Canada 44,300 32,895
Refugee dependents 10,820 10,380
Live-in caregivers, principal applicants, spouses and dependents 12,100 29,045
Backlog clearance program 35 0
Other immigrants, humanitarian and compassionate/public policy
considerations 20,115 34,915
Note: The "recent immigrants" counted in this table are those who were landed in the four
previous years to the year stated (i.e. 2006 or 2010). "Recent immigrants" landing in the year
stated are not counted as they land at different times during the year and their annual
earnings, which are used as an indicator of the success of immigration policies, do not reflect a
full year's participation in the labour market.
Source: Statistics Canada, Tabulations from Longitudinal Immigration Database (IMDB),
http://www5.statcan.gc.ca/cansim/a26?lang=eng&retrLang=eng&id=0540001&pattern=0540001&csid=.
Table 2
Total Count with Earnings by Immigrant Admission Category for Recent
Immigrants Landing in Previous Four Years for Number of Persons with
Earned Income
Immigrant Admission Category 2006 2010
Total 495,310 514,430
Family class 141,565 153,690
Business class, principal applicants 5,880 6,240
Business class, spouses and dependents 8,580 8,360
Skilled workers, principal applicants 145,090 117,180
Skilled workers, spouses and dependents 94,190 73,935
Provincial/territorial nominees, principal applicants 6,175 27,500
Provincial/territorial nominees, spouses and dependents 5,195 20,745
Government-assisted refugees 10,915 9,155
Privately sponsored refugees 6,670 7,630
Refugees landed in Canada 35,580 25,635
Refugee dependents 7,440 7,280
Live-in caregivers, principal applicants, spouses and dependents 12,000 28,465
Backlog clearance program 20 0
Other immigrants, humanitarian and compassionate/public policy
considerations 15,980 28,615
Note: The "recent immigrants" counted in this table are those who were landed in the four
previous years to the year stated (i.e. 2006 or 2010). "Recent immigrants" landing in the year
stated are not counted as they land at different times during the year and their annual
earnings, which are used as an indicator of the success of immigration policies, do not reflect a
full year's participation in the labour market.
Source: Statistics Canada, Tabulations from Longitudinal Immigration Database (IMDB),
http://www5.statcan.gc.ca/cansim/a26?lang=eng&retrLang=eng&id=0540001&pattern=0540001&csid=.
Table 3
Average Earnings by Immigrant Admission Category for Recent Immigrants
Landing in Previous Four Years in 2010 Constant Dollars
Immigrant Admission Category 2006 2010
Total $23,328 $24,883
Family class $19,521 $19,896
Business class, principal applicants $18,032 $20,768
Business class, spouses and dependents $10,559 $11,228
Skilled workers, principal applicants $33,543 $36,261
Skilled workers, spouses and dependents $17,447 $19,246
Provincial/territorial nominees, principal applicants $46,855 $45,581
Provincial/territorial nominees, spouses and dependents $16,765 $19,415
Government-assisted refugees $14,256 $14,011
Privately sponsored refugees $19,435 $18,900
Refugees landed in Canada $19,027 $20,092
Refugee dependents $12,298 $13,923
Live-in caregivers, principal applicants, spouses and dependents $24,895 $23,378
Backlog clearance program $27,648 --
Other immigrants, humanitarian and compassionate/public policy
considerations $22,177 $22,251
Information Item: Total Average Annual Earnings from SLID $38,200 $39,400
Note: The "recent immigrants" counted in this table are those who were landed in the four
previous years to the year stated (i.e. 2006 or 2010). "Recent immigrants" landing in the year
stated are not counted as they land at different times during the year and their annual
earnings, which are used as an indicator of the success of immigration policies, do not reflect a
full year's participation in the labour market.
Source: Statistics Canada, Tabulations from Longitudinal Immigration Database (IMDB),
http://www5.statcan.gc.ca/cansim/a26?lang=eng&retrLang=eng&id=0540001&pattern=0540001&csid=.
Table 4
Average Earnings by Immigrant Admission Category
for Immigrants Landing in Previous Four Years as
Percentage of Canada-wide Average Earnings (%)
Immigrant Admission Category 2006 2010
Total 61.1 63.2
Family class 51.1 50.5
Business class, principal applicants 47.2 52.7
Business class, spouses and dependents 27.6 28.5
Skilled workers, principal applicants 87.8 92
Skilled workers, spouses and dependents 45.7 48.8
Provincial/territorial nominees, principal applicants 122.7 115.7
Provincial/territorial nominees, spouses and dependents 43.9 49.3
Government-assisted refugees 37.3 35.6
Privately sponsored refugees 50.9 48
Refugees landed in Canada 49.8 51
Refugee dependents 32.2 35.3
Live-in caregivers, principal applicants, spouses and dependents 65.2 59.3
Backlog clearance program 72.4 --
Other immigrants, humanitarian and compassionate/public policy
considerations 58.1 56.5
Note: The "recent immigrants" counted in this table are those who were landed in the four
previous years to the year stated (i.e. 2006 or 2010). "Recent immigrants" landing in the year
stated are not counted as they land at different times during the year and their annual
earnings, which are used as an indicator of the success of immigration policies, do not reflect a
full year's participation in the labour market.
Source: Statistics Canada, Tabulations from Longitudinal Immigration Database (IMDB),
http://www5.statcan.gc.ca/cansim/a26?lang=eng&retrLang=eng&id=0540001&pattern=0540001&csid=.
